Introduction Following my post about the meeting between a concerned group of experts and Ivan McKee, the Scottish Government minister responsible for Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) (see here), parkswatch is publishing the report we discussed with him at the start of July over three posts. We presented the report as a draft and stated…
Author: Graham Garfoot
Most of my working life has been as a mechanic in various fields from commercial to private vehicles, so I have a practical and varied knowledge of mechanical engineering. In writing posts for parkswatch, I would hope it is obvious that I haven’t done all the work myself. I have been advised and assisted by…
Cover-up, incompetence, negligence or all three? At the end of my post in May (see here) I stated that the Scottish Government appeared at last to be realising that the business case presented by Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) for the repairs to the funicular railway was not as comprehensive as it should have been….
Last September I described how Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) released the Health and Safety file from the funicular construction nine months after I had requested it and how information within it undermined the official explanation to why the repairs to the funicular had been delayed (see here). With the recent revelations about how HIE…
Recently Highland and Islands Enterprise released the remains of the Health and Safety (H and S) File concerning the construction of the funicular railway required under the Construction, Design and Management (CDM) Regulations 1994. Having originally requested this file on 21/01/21 I received this email on 06/09/21 at 12.22p.m. from HIE:- I had been notified…
When I wrote post (6) (see here) in the series with this title I thought I had covered the majority of the issues with the funicular. I arrived at the conclusion that yes the repairs would work but with no idea of the longevity of those repairs. Job done. Then, on 04/05/2021 it was reported in…
“Oh what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive” This quote from Sir Walter Scott’s epic poem, of 1808, Marmion, is a neat way of saying that when you lie or act dishonestly you initiate problems and a domino structure of complications which eventually run out of control. It could have…
In my original post with this title (see here) I referred to “the demolition of other viable uplift”. This led at least one person to assume that Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) and Cairngorm Mountain Scotland Ltd (CMSL) were currently considering the demolition of other tows on the mountain. That was not my intention, I was…
Over the years there has been a lot of criticism of the positioning of the “mid-station” loading area and the increase in travel time, and hence delays, when it is in use, but this post takes a look at a couple of aspects that as far as I know have never been discussed. Why was…
Since the involvement of Highlands and Islands Enterprise HIE) with the Cairngorm ski resort and the construction of the funicular railway, the mountain business and its skier/ boarder capacity has gone downhill faster than G.B’s olympic skiers ever did. The folly is continuing with HIE deciding to have the funicular repaired at any cost and,…
This post takes a further look (see here) at the ongoing mismanagement of health and safety at Cairn Gorm. After concerns about the safety of the lift infrastructure at Cairngorm Mountain were raised by a member of the public in 2018 the Health & Safety Executive (H&SE) visited and issued three Improvement Notices. The Inspectors (“they”)…
When I started this series of posts (see here), (here), (here), (here) and (here) I had expected to write three, maybe four, before reaching a conclusion. But as time went on, more and more information has been revealed through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests. These FOI’s enabled correlation with the COWI (engineering )report, Highland and Islands Enterprise (HIE’s)…
Continuing this series of posts (see here), the idea for funicular at Cairn Gorm was I believe inspired by the Ellmau funicular. A comparison between the two railways is instructive and raises further questions about whether the proposed repairs to the Cairngorm Mountain funicular. The most outstanding difference is the viaduct itself, steel piers and…
Following on from my last post (see here), which looked at whether vibration from poorly maintained rails could have caused damage to the piers supporting the funicular, this post focuses on the concrete parts of the structure, especially the ends of the “I” support beams and the in-situ blocks. The “I” beams are described as…
Since the release of the COWI report on 11th December, which Highlands and Islands Enterprise had withheld for two years, Parkswatch has been able to start investigating the repair of funicular (see here) and (here). We have been uncovering new issues and questions on an almost daily basis. For example, Pier 9 (photo above) featured…
In the first part of this series of articles (see here), about whether the repairs Highland and Islands Enterprise (HIE) has planned for the funicular will work, the following picture was thought to be that of a pier base. Photo credit. G.Paton. It is now believed to be that of Anchor Block(AB) 48. Notice there…
In the last three weeks two very significant pieces of information about the funicular railway have been made public and both raise serious questions about the proposed repairs. The original plans for the construction of the funicular Highland and Island Enterprise (HIE)’s £16m business case for repairing the funicular (see here) did not explain why…
Photo courtesy of the Save the Ciste campaign showing the Funicular Viaduct from the washing line tow. Is this what the mountain will look like when work commences? The development of the Business Case to repair of the funicular (see here) was shrouded in secrecy. This post takes a look at what Highland and Islands…
The Folly A folly is defined as:- (1) the quality of being foolish. (2) a foolish action, idea, etc., and, (3) an imitation castle, temple etc. built as a decoration in a large garden or park (National Park?)! And that is exactly what the Cairngorm ski resort has become because of the failed aspirations of…
Highlands and Islands Enterprises (HIE) are at it again as evidenced by the latest planning application, to repair the funicular (see here for papers). It has been noted many times in the past that HIE have a habit of pre-empting decisions being made about operations at the Cairngorm Mountain ski resort, currently being operated under…
Sometime between August 2019 and February 2020, the webpage (see here) isn’t dated, the Highlands and Islands Enterprises (HIE) website was updated with the following information on Cairn Gorm under “regional projects”:- No one can disagree with the first two paragraphs (Ed. see above!] although in para.2 the wording should have been “the WINTER economy”,…
Two very interesting articles on Parkswatch by Alistair Bell (see here) and Drennan Watson (see here) go some way towards explaining some of what has gone on and is going on at Cairngorm Mountain Scotland Ltd (CMSL). Alistair Bell says skiers are partly to blame because nobody really questioned what was happening until the Save…
In 2018 and again in 2019 the SE Group were commissioned by Highlands and Islands Enterprises (HIE) to report on a sustainable, economically viable business plan (see here) for the redevelopment of the Cairngorm ski resort with its knock on economic benefits to the local communities. Since then a new report into reducing snow cover…
This post reveals two further examples of how CairnGorm Mountain is being mismanaged. These confirm that there is something rotten at both Highlands & Islands Enterprises (HIE) and Cairngorm Mountain Scotland Ltd (CMSL). Both these organisations are in desperate need of a clean-out if what was once Scotland’s premier ski resort is to return…
Highlands and Islands Enterprises (HIE) last month released estimates for the costs of removal and repair of the Funicular Railway (see here) which was taken out of operation 15 months ago after concerns were raised about the safety of the structure. The “high end” estimate for removal is £13.3M, with a provision of £9.6M in…