The funicular may have been non-operational and much of the other uplift removed but provision for snowsports at Cairn Gorm this winter was much worse than it should have been given the amount of snow making equipment Highlands and Islands Enterprise had bought for its subsidiary Cairngorm Mountain (Scotland) Ltd (CMSL). The screenshots in this…
Author: Graham Garfoot
On the evening of 28th February, HIE’s fully owned subsidiary Cairngorm Mountain Scotland Ltd (CMSL) announced it was moving to a five day week and would not be operating on Tuesdays and Wednesdays. This decision was met with disbelief by snowsports enthusiasts, particularly those who had bought season tickets, but also affected CMSL’s ability…
(A) The steel strengthening brackets This picture shows the three different types of bracket used in the strengthening works. I have labelled these:- Type 1. The bracket in the foreground (used in the central section of the “I” beam Type 2. The brackets around the insitu block either side of the number 23 Type…
After my post on Concrete and the Death of a Ski Resort (see here) the following comment was posted which I think deserves a proper reply. Environmental change Significant human intervention began at Cairn Gorm when skiers first arrived and decided it was the best place to build a ski area, a resort that has…
After my last post I had conversations with a couple of people about my conclusions that the insitu stitch/ joints are the wrong way up, i.e. instead of the joint being wedge shaped, as in the picture above, it should be more of a pyramid, as in my drawing below. There were a…
While researching why the funicular was beams were built out of concrete rather than steel (see here), apart from being told that the beams should have been deeper, “tensioning” was mentioned. I didn’t appreciate the importance of what was being talked about at the time but then, after my last post (see here), this comment appeared:-…
Since the funicular was closed on 25th August for “snagging” (see here) to address public safety concerns the re-opening date keeps getting put back. The latest is Monday – 16/10/2023! Little further information has been forthcoming from HIE about the reasons for the closure or the work being done although following my post they did once…
In June HIE claimed the funicular was perfectly safe On 09/06/2023, after being contacted by several Parkswatch readers, I wrote a letter (see here) raising safety concerns about the Cairn Gorm funicular to Stuart Black, Chief Executive Officer of Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE), who own it. On 21/06/2023, I received a reply not from…
Photo courtesy of PW reader showing reinforcement of an “I” beam below the Shieling. My first post in this series (see here) showed how the original design for the funicular was for a steel structure but it was then changed to concrete. When questioned by the Public Audit Committee about this in 2009 Highland and…
My first post in this series (see here) looked at the reasons Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) gave to the Public Accounts Committee about why they decided to build the funicular out of concrete rather than steel. These came down to cost but no evidence was provided to substantiate this This post takes a detailed…
Most funicular railways across the world are supported by steel rather than concrete structures. Following my series of posts in 2021 asking if the repairs to the funicular would work (see here), I decided to investigate further the reasons why the funicular was constructed out of concrete to understand the repair work better and the…
This post considers a number of outstanding concerns about the safety of the funicular at Cairn Gorm and HIE’s response. The context for this is HIE has never given a proper explanation for the failure of the funicular and without that information it is not possible to tell how long the repairs might work or…
This post is a critical analysis of the latest report into the impact of snowsports commissioned by the Scottish Government which was quietly published in January (see here). The report contains some major flaws/ inaccuracies which need to be addressed and has implications for all of Scotland’s ski centres, including the three in the Cairngorms…
This post has been informed by comments made on my series of six posts on “Will the repairs to the funicular work” and discussion with people with a far greater knowledge of construction and civil engineering than me. When I commented on this picture in my second post on the funicular court cases (see here)…
In Part 1 of this post (see here) I suggested there are at least two other major parties who should have been included in Highland and Island Enterprise (HIE)’s funicular court cases if these are intended as serious attempts to recover public money rather than an attempt to deflection attention away from HIE’s own sorry role…
After the funicular on Cairn Gorm broke down and subsequent posts on Parkswatch, there were many calling for a judge lead inquiry into the causes of the failure of the business CairnGorm Mountain Ltd and the funicular railway. HIE have continually resisted this but are currently, and have for some time, themselves been taking legal…
In my post about how Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) and Cairngorm Mountain Scotland Ltd (CMSL) have “all the gear, no idea” (see here), I mentioned that as far as I know there is only one person in Scotland with the necessary qualifications to operate a ski resort. I then decided to have a look…
It is more than apparent that HIE will never allow the dysfunctional monstrosity of a funicular, so abhorred by snow sports enthusiasts and environmentalists, to be dismantled, especially after the huge repair bill funded by the Scottish Government, unless something goes so catastrophically wrong that they have no choice. But there is another option, just…
What a fantastic day! Snow, lots of it and in perfect condition, weather fantastic, but the customer service left a lot to be desired, including a train that didn’t start running until after 09.30! In January 2020 I wrote a post outlining a plan for snowsports at Cairn Gorm (see here). Since then some things…
Well, that might describe staff at Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) but certainly not at Cairngorm Mountain Scotland Ltd (CMSL). So what is the problem at Cairn Gorm? Despite having more money thrown at it than any other ski business in the U.K., e.g. (1) 100% funding for any equipment that they need whereas the…
This post contains the third part of the report that was presented to Ivan McKee, the Minister responsible for Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) at the beginning of July (see here for background to the meeting and a note of the discussion). Draft Report in response to the financial crisis facing Cairngorm Part III…
This post contains the second part of the report (see here for first) that was presented to Ivan McKee, the Minister responsible for Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) at the beginning of July. Draft Report in response to the financial crisis facing Cairngorm Part II The bigger picture 4) What is needed at Cairn…
Introduction Following my post about the meeting between a concerned group of experts and Ivan McKee, the Scottish Government minister responsible for Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) (see here), parkswatch is publishing the report we discussed with him at the start of July over three posts. We presented the report as a draft and stated…
Most of my working life has been as a mechanic in various fields from commercial to private vehicles, so I have a practical and varied knowledge of mechanical engineering. In writing posts for parkswatch, I would hope it is obvious that I haven’t done all the work myself. I have been advised and assisted by…
Cover-up, incompetence, negligence or all three? At the end of my post in May (see here) I stated that the Scottish Government appeared at last to be realising that the business case presented by Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) for the repairs to the funicular railway was not as comprehensive as it should have been….